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CENSORSHIP OF POLITICAL BROADCASTS*
SECTION 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 requires that radio sta-
tions grant equal speaking opportunity to all qualified political candidates,
and prohibits censorship of the material which is broadcast.' Yet the tort
laws of some states make radio stations liable for defamatory publications.-
Once the broadcaster grants time to a single campaign speaker,, defamatory
matter in any subsequent speech is deleted at the risk of violating federal
law; on the other hand, it is broadcast at the peril of transgressing state law.,.
* In re Application of Port Huron Broadcasting Company for Renewal of License,
F.C.C. 48-1116, Dkt. No. 6987, 4 Pixn & FiscHER RADIO PEG. (FCC Opinions) 1 (194S).
1. 48 STAT. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C § 315 (1946) :
"If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the Commission
shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect: Prozqcld, That such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions
of this section. No obligation is hereby imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its
station by any such candidate."
2. Almost all states have enacted general libel and slander laws imposing both civil
and criminal liability. Only a few states refer specifically to radio. CT. P.-. Corm
§§ 258-60 (Deering 1941), N.D. Rev. ConE § 12-2815 (1943), and OR. Comp. LAws
§23-437 (1940), which make a speaker criminally liable for defamatory utterances,
may be broad enough to include radio stations. FLA. STAT. AimN. §770.03 (1944), IowA
CODE § 659.5 (1946), MfoxT. Rev. CODE § 5694.1 (Supp. 1939), and WAsu. REv. STAT.
§ 998-1 (Remington Supp. 1943) make radio stations liable only if negligent. Im. STAT.
ANN. § 2-518 (Bums 1946) excuses liability if the publication is made in good faith
and a retraction is issued. Ii.. STAT. ANN. c. 38, §404.1-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1948)
and 1942 V.. CODE § 5796b (Supp. 1948) render radio faultless for defamation by a politi-
cal candidate.
By case law Nebraska and Missouri hold radio stations liable vthout fault. Soren-
sen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.V. 82 (1932) ; Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.,
8 F. Supp. 889 (Mlo. 1934).
Not only may a radio station be liable under state law for publication of defamatory
statements, but also such publications may invoke FCC sanctions. Trinity Methodist
Church, South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F.2d 850 (App. D.C. 1932), ccrt. dcnicd,
284 U.S. 685 (1931), 288 U.S. 599 (1932) (affirmed refusal to renew license); Belling-
ham Publishing Co., 6 F.C.C. 31 (1938) (license application denied, one consideration
in the decision being that the applicant owned a newspaper, which had followed a course
of libeling citizens of the community). See Mosen & L.,wvwr RADIo Ain Tnr LAw U2-3
(1947).
3. Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., 163 F2d 313, 315 (9th Cir. 1947) held
that the section is only applicable when there are two or more such candidates, one of
whom has used the facilities of the station. For criticism of the lTVss case, see Notes,
61 HA av. L. REv. 552 (1948) and 21 So. CALr. L. Rev. 292 (1948).
The rule of the Veiss case allows unlimited censorship as to the first speaker. The
FCC has adopted a view, however, which would allow §315 to operate in certain
cases even before one candidate has spoken. See note 5 infra.
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A solution of the broadcaster's dilemma has been attempted by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission in a recent decision on the application of
the Port Huron Broadcasting Company for license renewal.4 In this pro-
ceeding, renewal was challenged on the ground that Port Huron had violated
Section 315 by censoring certain political speeches.' The Commission de-
clared that the section prohibits the deletion of, or refusal to broadcast,
defamatory material, but unwilling to penalize the licensee for a non-willful
violation, it renewed his license. 6 The Commission further concluded that
since enforcement of state defamation laws as a practical matter would
compel violation of this absolute prohibition, the state laws must be sus-
pended as to all speeches coming within Section 315.7
The Port Huron decision marks a departure from the only significant
4. Port Huron Broadcasting Company, F.C.C. 48-1116, Dkt. No. 6987, 4 PiicE &
FISCHER RADIO REG. (FCC Opinions) 1 (1948).
5. T. N. Tobias, H. C. Davis and the incumbent C. E. Muir were candidates for
election to the office of City Commissioner of Port Huron, Michigan. During the time
Muir was an avowed candidate for re-election, he made a "non-political" speech over
the Port Huron Broadcasting Company station concerning one of the leading issues in
the election campaign. One MacTaggart claimed that he had been libelled by the broad-
cast but stated that he would take no legal action unless there were a recurrence.
Subsequently the three candidates contracted with the station for time to make cam-
paign speeches. Muir's script contained further attacks on MacTaggart, who stated on
viewing the remarks that he could prove the charges to be false. The station thereupon
cancelled the contracts for the three speeches and refused to sell or give time to any
candidate for City Commissioner. Although the FCC found that no speech advancing
a political candidacy had been made, the cancelling of all three speeches under these
circumstances was held to violate § 315. But cf. Weiss v. Los Angeles Broadcasting Co,,
note 3 supra.
6. The FCC recognized that it would be unfair to penalize the station in view of
the fact that the Commission had not previously expressed its interpretation of § 315.
Furthermore, the language of § 315 might have led the licensee to believe that the section
was not applicable on the facts of the Port Huron case. Cf. Weiss v. Los Angeles Broad-
casting Co., note 3 supra.
7. The most obvious conflict between state and federal law occurs when both
sovereigns seek to regulate or control the same phase of a given subject in which case
the federal law must govern. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824). But the broad
test of invalidity of a state law, relied upon by the Commission in the Port Huron case,
is whether it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the valid objectives of
Congress. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) ; Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913). Thus,
federal control has superseded state control of defamation carried by telegraph despite
the absence of a specific provision as to defamation in the federal statute. O'Brien v.
Western Union, 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940). See Donnelly, Defamation By Radio. A
Reconsideration, 34 IOWA L. Rnv. 12, 33-7 (1948).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has said that an unexpressed purpose to
nullify a state's statute is not lightly to be attributed to Congress. Johnson v. Radio
Station WOW, 326 U.S. 120 (1945) (power of the state to regulate fraudulent convey-
ances of radio station property not suspended). See generally as to the interplay of
federal and local power, 1 SocoLow, THE LAw OF RADIO BROADCASTING 186-8 (1939).
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interpretation of the Section previously made by a court. In Sorensen v.
Wood,9 the Nebraska court imposed strict liability under state law for the
broadcast of libelous statements.' The court there construed the federal
statute as precluding the licensee from censoring words as to their political
or partisan trend, but not as preventing the deletion of defamatory matter.
In rejecting the Nebraska court's interpretation of Section 315, the FCC
relied, in part, on legislative history. Section 315 was originally enacted as
Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927," which as proposed created a specific
immunity from liability under state law. 2 This proviso, however, was
deleted in committee with no reason given. The committee holding hearings
to amend the Radio Act indicated that Section 18 was misconstrued by
Sorensen v. Wood," but in the adoption of Section 315 no change was made.
Since 1934 several attempts have been made to amend Section 315 to absolve
the licensee from state liability or to permit him to delete defamatory mate-
rial, but none has been successful.'4 On a balance, it would seem that the
8. Only two judicial decisions have interpreted § 315 as to its effect on censorship
and liability for defamation. In Sorensen v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932),
the court viewed the section as permitting censorship of defamatory material. In Joseph-
son v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
however, a New York lower court stated that the statute was absolute in its prohibitions
and read a qualified privilege to broadcast defamatory statements into the statute. This
latter case has never been authoritatively cited.
9. 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932), appcaI divmssed sub nom. IKFAB Broad-
casting Co. v. Sorensen, 290 U.S. 599 (1933) (judgment based on an adequate non-
federal ground).
10. The Sorensen case, note 9 supra, is the leading case espousing the rule of strict
liability for radio stations. It was followed in Miles v. Louis Wasmer, Inc., 172 Wash.
466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) and Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 8S9 (Mo.
1934) and cited with approval in Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 61 P2d 1127, 1130
(1938).
11. 44 STAT. 1170 (1927), repealed, 48 STAT. 1102 (1934).
12. Section 18, as originally proposed, e.\plicitly made the radio station a common
carrier. But in the Senate, Senator Dill offered a substitute provision exculpating sta-
tions from both civil and criminal liability for defamation. 67 Coxo. REsc. 12501 (1926).
This provision, however, was not incorporated in the Act as finally passed.
13. Hearings before Senate Committce on Intcrstate Comn-nree on HR. 7716, 72nd
Cong., 2d Sess. Part 2, 9-11 (1932).
14. H.R. 9230, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) (no liability); S. 1520, Sect. 5, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) (express authority to delete defamatory material); S. 814, 11,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) (e.\press authority to delete defamatory material); The
White Bill, S. 1333 (as anended), § 14(d), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948) (no liability).
The FCC periodically has made proposals to Congress for amendment of § 315 to
clarify the responsibilities, privileges, and immunities of radio stations. Sce statements
of Chairman Fly urging institution of a provision immunizing radio stations from state
liability, Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerc o S. 814, 7Sth
Cong., 1st Sess. 63-4, 68 (1943), and Chairman Denny, Hearings before Senate Sub-
committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. 1333, SOth Cong., 1st Sess. 14-73
(1947).
Congressional inaction may have been caused by doubt as to the power of the Federal
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inconsistency between deletion of the immunity clause and apparent com-
mittee disapproval of the Sorensen case renders the legislative history in-
conclusive as to the proper construction of Section 315.
The Commission's position gains strong support, however, from the anal-
ogy of radio stations to telegraph companies. In O'Brien v. Western Union,'5
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held telegraph companies exempt
from state defamation laws despite the absence of a specific immunity in the
Communications Act. The principal basis of the decision was that the Act
establishes a comprehensive system of federal regulation and, as such, super-
sedes state defamation law inconsistent with the purposes of the Act." It
can be argued that the analogy fails because these companies are common
carriers, which must accept all traffic proffered. 7 But although radio sta-
tions are not technically common carriers,"8 Section 315 implicitly makes
them so, once a single candidate is granted the use of the station's facilities.19
An analogy to newspapers, 0 used by the court in the Sorensen case, seems
Government to provide immunity against state defamation law. Hearings Before Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 814, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-4 (1943). Another
possible explanation is that amendments to § 315 were proposed in bills, some of the
other provisions of which were objectionable, and the bills were rejected in full,
15. 113 F.2d 539 (lst Cir. 1940).
16. Section 202(a) of the Communications Act of 1934 forbids unreasonable discrimi-
nation by telegraph companies in the matters of charges, practices, services, etc. Sections
206 and 207 make the companies liable in damages where private injury results from
an unlawful act or omission. In view of this comprehensive scheme of regulation the
court concluded that Congress had occupied the field; therefore questions relating to
the duties, liabilities, and privileges of telegraph companies must be governed by uniform
federal rules.
17. 48 STAT. 1065-6 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h) (1946).
Another distinction is that defamatory matter transmitted by telegram reaches fewer
recipients than defamatory material which is broadcast. It would seem, however, that le
number of recipients should be taken into account only in determining the extent of
damages. See generally Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation, 19 MxNX. L. REv.
611, 652-5 (1935); Comment, Libel and Slander-Clarification of Radio Defamation-
Liability of Broadcaster, 39 Micr. L. Rxv. 1002, 1006 (1941); Keller, Federal Control
of Defamation by Radio, 12 NomRE DAmE LAW. 134, 160, 171 (1937).
Telegraph companies traditionally have been held liable for defamation only when
obviously negligent. E.g., Nye v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 104 Fed. 628 (C.C.D.
Minn. 1900); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 294 Fed. 167 (8th Cir. 1923);
Flynn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 199 Wis. 124, 225 N.W. 742 (1929). 3 RESTAz-
MENT, TORTS § 612 (1938).
18. 48 STAT. 1065 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h) (1946); Sta-Shine Products Co. v.
Station WGBB, 188 I.C.C. 271 (1932).
19. Section 18 of the Radio Act as originally proposed contained a provision making
radio stations common carriers with respect to political broadcasts. See note 12 supra.
Although this proviso was deleted, the view was expressed that the bill as passed made
stations common carriers with regard to political candidates, once one candidate had
been offered the opportunity to speak. 67 CONG. REc. 12501-3 (1926).
20. As a general rule, newspapers are strictly accountable for everything they pub-
lish. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909) ; Donnelly, supra note 7, at 19. Professor
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far more vulnerable. Even assuming the Nebraska court's view that Sec-
tion 315 is not absolute in its prohibition, it seems relevant that the licensee
must face problems which do not plague the newspaper: a radio station can-
not guard completely against impromptu remarks,21 and local outlets carr-
ing programs of a national chain have little control over the material which
is broadcast.22
The prospect that this conflict will be resolved by a Supreme Court deci-
sion is not immediate, since judicial review of the Port Huron opinion was
precluded by the fact that the station's license was renewed. And in the
absence of a Supreme Court decision approving the Commission's inter-
pretation of Section 315, stations may be liable in the courts for the broad-
cast of defamatory material. 23 Indeed, the Attorney General of Texas has
Void, who submitted an ainicus curiae brief in the Serensen case, has been one of the
staunchest advocates of holding radio stations to the same standard of liability. Void,
sutra note 17, at 637-9, 644-8; see also Keller, supra note 17, at 153-62.
Radio stations have also been analogized to telephones, telegraphs, news vendors, ant]
public address systems in a hall. And the arguments for and against these analogies are
marshalled, but no conclusion is drawn in Comment, Libel and Slander, supra note 17, at
1006-1010.
21. Void, supra note 17, and Keller, supra note 17, contend that stations have suf-
ficient control over impromptu remarks with the automatic turn-off switch. Usually,
however, the damage is done before the switch can be thrown.
That the problem of impromptu remarks requires rejection of the newspaper analogy
was asserted in Summit Hotel Co. v. N.B.C., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A2d 302 (1939). Accord,
Kelly v. Hoffman, 61 A.2d 143 (N.J.Ct.Err. & App. 1948). See also McCQL.%An, CE:-
SORSHIP OF RADIO BroADcAsns 63-6 (Dissertation Submitted to and Accepted by George-
town Law School 1938, copy in Yale Law School Library); Kadin, Adiduiistratizc
Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures, and Radio Broadcasting, 19 B.U.L.
REv. 533, 579 (1939).
It should also be borne in mind that the use of a switch for deleting impromptu re-
marks raises the same legal problems as are inherent in deletion from a prepared manu-
script.
22. Section 315 seems applicable to a local station carrying programs of a national
chain. Once the local has transmitted the speech of a single candidate, apparently it
will be obliged to carry talks by all other candidates for the same office. However, if
the local does not broadcast the first speech over the national hookup, but does broadcast
a subsequent address by another candidate, a peculiar question arises as to the ability
of the first speaker to force a rebroadcast of his speech.
While the courts have as yet not faced the particular question of a local outlet's
liability for defamatory publications originated elsewhere, stations may in some states be
held liable without fault. See note 2 supra. Absolute liability was imposed in a somewhat
analogous situation in Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., S F.Supp. 839 (Mo. 1934)
(radio station held liable when speaker, broadcasting via telephonic connection, inserted
ad lib remark).
23. See Lee, Legislative and Adnuistratih'e Regulations, 29 GEo. LJ. 1, 24-5 (1940);
Morgenthau, Inplied Regulatory Powers in Admiidstrative Law, 28 Iow,t L. REv. 575,
582 (1943).
In reviewing Sorensen v. Wood, note 9 supra, the Supreme Court dismissed the ap-
peal because the decision was supported by an adequate non-federal ground. It is possible
that both state and lower federal courts will construe this dismissal as authorizing the
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already announced that Texas will not follow the decision,2 4 and a three-
judge federal district court in Texas has stated that the interpretation does
not have the effect of law, but is merely an expression of the view that the
Commission has consistently advocated to Congress.25
Radio stations originating broadcasts, however, can take a few steps to
mitigate their unenviable position. 2S Submission of a script in advance can
be required 27 with the hope that the speaker, reluctant to subject himself
to liability, will delete material which the station considers defamatory.22
Furthermore, nothing in the Act or in the Port Huron decision prevents a
station from requiring that an indemnity bond be posted by each political
candidate using its facilities. Local stations receiving and transmitting
imposition of state defamation liability on radio stations until the Supreme Court or
Congress authoritatively clarifies § 315.
24. While acknowledging the power of the Federal Government to grant immunity
from state libel and slander law, the Attorney General of Texas believes that Congtess
has not exercised such power. Statement of C. K. Richards, Ass't Attorney General of
Texas, Hearings Before Select Committee of the House of Representatives to Inveshgate
the Federal Communications Commission, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 41-2 (1948).
25. See Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F.Supp. 199, 204 (S.D. Tex. 194S)
(dismissed on jurisdictional grounds).
26. The provision of § 315 allowing the broadcaster to refuse time to all candidates
is an illusory escape from the dilemma. Such a course of action would appear contrary to
the public interest and might cost the station its license. Cf. Homer P. Rainey, Dit.
No. 7666, 3 PIKE & FiscHER, RADIO REa., 737 (1947).
27. Cf. Rose v. Brown, 186 Misc. 553, 58 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup.Ct. 1945) ; MosEt &
LVIE, op. cit. supra note 2.
28. The general policy of radio stations prior to the Port Huron decision was to
demand submission of all scripts in advance. The scripts were read by counsel and if
defamatory material was found, the speaker was so informed. If the speaker did not
delete, he would be refused time to speak. See statements of W. T. Pierson, Washington
counsel for ten radio stations throughout the country, and Don Petty, general counsel of
the N.A.B, in Hearings Before Select Committee of the House of Representative, to
Investigate the Federal Communications Commission, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 36-9, 73
(1948). See also the statement of Governor Hobby, president of station KPRC Houston,
Texas, Transcript of Evidence pp. 67-8, The Houston Post Co. v. United States and
FCC, 79 F.Supp. 199 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
In most instances the candidate has been willing to delete. If he refuses and Is de-
nied time, he will usually let the matter drop after reporting the station to the FCC,
which, to date, has not failed to renew a license because of censorship by the station,
In the files of the FCC are many reports of station censorship. One example of the
gross misapplication of the Sorensen case involved the owner of the only radio station
and newspaper in a small west coast town. As candidate for mayor of the town, he had
campaigned by radio. The other candidate for the office was denied the use of the radio
station because of alleged defamatory statements aimed at the newspaper.
In Rose v. Brown, 186 Misc. 553, 58 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1945), the court held
that a broadcasting station cannot be compelled under a broadcasting contract, to transmit
a broadcast, any part of the script of which may reasonably be construed as subjecting
the station to liability for libel or slander. Radio stations cannot, however, refuse to
broadcast after entering into a contract, where the party speaking honestly makes ad-
verse characterizations respecting those in activities tinged with public interest.
[Vol, 58
NOTES
broadcasts, however, can do little but trust in the originator and insure
against liability.
29
Even considering the trend away from strict liability for defamation in
recent cases '3 and statutes,31 and the fact that the FCC rarely fails to renewv
a license, 2 the broadcaster's position is precarious. 3 The most clear-cut
29. The effect of the Port Huron decision on the availability and rates of insurance
has not as yet been determined. One type of policy in widespread use excluded any risl:
in violation of state law; another stipulated that scripts of political speeches must be re-
ceived in advance, and that due care must be exercised in selection to eliminate possibili-
ties of libel and slander. The rates to cover the risk here involved are often very high.
See statement of IV. T. Pierson, supra note 28, at 36-7. See also, Donnelly, sapra note 7,
at 21n.43.
30. Some courts have refused to hold broadcasters liable for impromptu defamatory
remarks. Summit Hotel Co. v. N.B.C., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939) ; Kelly v. Hoffman,
61 A.2d 143 (N.J. 1943).
31. Some states statutes have been amended to give radio stations absolute immunity
from the consequences of remarks made by political speakers where consorship is not
allowed, or to make broadcasters liable only vhere negligent. IL. STAT. A.:-. c. 33,
§404.1-2 (Smith-Hurd 1943), amending ILn. Rnv. STAT. c. 126, §4 (Bar Ass'n 1937);
WASH. REv. STAT. § 998-1 (Remington Supp. 1943), amending VAsH. Rv. STAT.
§§2424-34 (Remington 1932) so as to overrule Miles v. Louis Wasmer Inc., 172 Vash.
466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933).
32. Comment, Radio Controls: A ANheork of Inadequacy, 57 YAxm L.J. 275, 220n.26
(1947). Chairman Coy has stated that if another case came before the Commission with
facts similar to those in the Port Huron case, the license would again be renewed. Hcar-
ings Before tke Select Comnmittee of the House of Representatk'es to Investigale tke Fed-
ral Conmunications Commission, Sbth Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1948). In fact, although
Station WGOV, Valdosta, Georgia, refused speaking time to a candidate because of the
defamatory character of his script, its license was renewed subsequent to the Port Huron
decision, on August 4, 1943, without opinion.
The hesitancy of the FCC to revoke, or fail to renew, a license has been due to the
severity of this sanction. The only other sanction available to the Commission is a crimi-
nal prosecution. 48 STAT. 1100-1 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-2 (1946). Because both sanc-
tions are severe the Commission has usually let a station go unpunished for minor infrac-
tions of the Communications Act. It has been proposed that the FCC be given power
to issue cease and desist orders, a power which would promote its efficiency. S. 1333 (as
amended), § 12 (b), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1948).
The Commmission confines its suppression actions almost exclusively to renewal
applications, throwing the burden on the licensee of proving himself innocent before he
can become entitled to license renewal. For criticism of this procedure, see McCLrE.A3;,
op. cit. snPra note 21, at 58. Commission policy as to the responsibilities of radio stations
has previously been enunciated in dicta in decisions wherein the license was renewed. May-
flower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941) (prohibiting editorializing). The FCC has
also published a booklet setting forth its desires with respect to program content and
chain broadcasting. FCC, PUBLIC SERvIcE RrEsroNsmnLr oF Bu oAcAsr Licz:cns (re-
ferred to as the Blue Book) (1946). The Blue Book was held not revievmble since it
was not agency action. Hearst Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 167 F2d 225 (App.D.C. 1947).
33. Although the dicta in the Port Huron decision is denominated as merely statutory
interpretation by the FCC, to the licensee it constitutes a rule or regulation. Conse-
quently, the licensee risks his license, if he should censor. Statement of Don Petty, .spra
note 28, at 74. The FCC has the power to grant, deny, revoke, or refuse to renew a
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solution to his dilemma would be Congressional amendment explicitly in-
corporating either the Sorensen or Port Huron rule into the statute.
If the Sorensen rule is adopted, the stations will remain subject to liability,
and will carefully inspect all scripts before allowing them to be broadcast.
The threat of liability is salutary in that it requires a station to use its own
objectivity and expertise to delete defamatory matter, which otherwise,
where speakers were reckless or financially irresponsible, might be broad-
cast. But an unfortunate result of the rule is that stations may, in some
jurisdictions, be held liable for impromptu remarks over which they have no
real control. And since irresponsible candidates may frequently be found
ifi small towns, where almost anyone can be a candidate, the risk of liability
is greatest in the case of the small local stations which have the least ex-
pertise and resources. With rates for insurance, where available, dependent
on the risk involved, the station least able to afford it must pay dispropor-
tionately high premiums. Furthermore, and perhaps more important,
the power to delete coupled with the threat of liability will cause more
remarks to be eliminated than would be considered defamatory by a court
of law. 4 Since questions of personal integrity often are the principal areas
of contention in political campaigns, much of the most telling criticism, even
where true, will presumably be censored by the stations in the name of cau-
tion. Under the same stated policy, some stations might discriminate
between candidates in deleting supposedly defamatory matter. And unless
a sustained policy of over-caution or clear discrimination could be shown,
the FCC would hesitate to use its most readily available sanction-the
extreme penalty of denial of license renewal.35
If the Port Huron rule were adopted, the denial of a defamed party's
surest remedy and the removal of the most effective deterrent to defamation
would undoubtedly cause some hardship. But the injured party is not, of
course, without a remedy, for he may still sue the candidate. While the
latter may be financially irresponsible, he cannot as a political candidate
license in accordance with the standard set up by Congress: "public convenience, interest,
or necessity." 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307 (a) (1946). Unless administrative
interpretations are challenged in the courts, they become the law, and those who are
subject to their administration are forced to comply with them. NAT. Ass'x ov BROAD-
CASTERS, BROADCASTING AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 25-31 (1948). The fact that the Com-
mission has not previously dealt drastically with offenders does not bind it, as a matter
of law, to follow that policy of leniency in the future. FCC v. WOO, Inc., 329 U.S.
223 (1946).
34. Even where censorship is performed impartially, the cautious tendencies of
licensees cause them to delete more statements than those actually defamatory at law.
See Statement of W.T. Pierson, supra note 28, at 39.
35. See note 32 supra. If the FCC desires to revoke a license, it would have the
burden of proof, a burden which it seeks to avoid. The only other sanction available
is a criminal prosecution promulgated by the Attorney General. This alternative in-
volves at least an equal burden of proof. The Commission would more adequately be able
to control the unrestricted censorship under the Sorensen rule, if it were provided with
some mean process, such as the power to issue cease and desist orders.
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